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Founding our analysis on the Geneva-Brussels approach to the foundations of physics, we provide
a clarification and classification of the key concept of observation. An entity can be observed with
or without a scope. In the second case, the observation is a purely non-invasive discovery process;
in the first case, it is a purely invasive process, which can involve either creation or destruction as-
pects. An entity can also be observed with or without a full control over the observational process.
In the latter case, the observation can be described by a symmetry breaking mechanism, through
which a specific deterministic observational process is selected among a number of potential ones, as
explained in Aerts’ hidden measurement approach. This is what is called a product test, or product
observation, whose consequences are that outcomes can only be predicted in probabilistic terms, as
it is the case in typical quantum measurements. We also show that observations can be about in-
trinsic (stable) properties of the observed entity, or about relational (ephemeral) properties between
the observer and observed entities; also, they can be about intermediate properties, neither purely
classical, nor purely quantum. Our analysis allows us to propose a general conceptual characteri-
zation of quantum measurements, as observational processes involving three aspects: (1) product
observations, (2) pure creation aspects and (3) ephemeral relational properties. We also discuss the
important concept of non-spatiality and emphasize some of the differences and similarities between
quantum and classical/relativistic observations.
I. PREMISE
The purpose of the present article is to provide a
clarification and classification of the concept of obser-
vation, as used in physical sciences. To do so, we shall
make extensive use of the findings of the Geneva-Brussels
school in the foundations of physics, which counts within
its founders Josef Maria Jauch, Constantin Piron and
Diederik Aerts (see for instance Refs. 1–10 and the refer-
ences cited therein). Therefore, as a whole, the present
essay can also be considered as a non-technical review of
some of the results and intuitions developed in the last
decades by this school, and more particularly by Diederik
Aerts, in his creation-discovery view [6, 7] and hidden
measurement approach [7, 11].
However, in the present article we shall make some di-
dactical choices that slightly differ from those employed
by Aerts and collaborators. The most important one
is about the concept of observation, which is the cen-
tral theme of the present work. In the ambit of the
creation-discovery view, it is usually stated that quan-
tum measurements are not just observations, as they can
provoke a real change of the state of the measured entity.
In the following, we shall turn such a statement upside
down and adopt an opposite semantic view: observations
are not only detections of what pre-existed in a physical
system, but processes that in general can also provoke
changes, and this remains true also outside of the mi-
croscopic domain. In other terms, our didactical point
will be to show that observation is a much wider concept
as is usually understood, which also includes the idea of
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transformation.
Because of the nature of this essay, which on one hand
goes over some (not sufficiently well) known results of the
Geneva-Brussels school (and particularly those of Piron
and Aerts) and on the other hand presents these same
results with sometimes a slightly different perspective, it
is clearly not very practical to always distinguish in the
text the pieces of reasoning which are literally borrowed
from Piron, Aerts and collaborators, and those instead
that, although inspired by those reasoning, are presented
here in a slightly different form or perspective, without
compromising the readability and flow of the text.
Therefore, we encourage the reader who will be fasci-
nated by the ideas presented in this work, to go back to
the original sources, to which we will often refer to in the
text, to also appreciate the different expositional style,
didactical choices, and pieces of explanations that were
provided by their creators.
But there are also – we believe – a few interesting orig-
inal ideas and examples in our analysis, which as far as
we can judge have not yet been made fully explicit by
the above authors, like for instance our characterization
of quantum measurements as observations of truly rela-
tional properties between the observer and the observed
entities, as a simple explanation for their ephemeral na-
ture.
That said, we might add that if we had had the chance
to have access to the conceptual clarification presented
in this article, when as young students we approached
for the first time quantum physics, surely we would have
found the content of this theory far less mysterious, and
its conceptual understanding much less problematic.
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2II. INTRODUCTION
Observation is a central concept in science and its cor-
rect understanding is evidently of the utmost importance.
Outside of science, observation also plays a crucial role,
as it is by observing that, generally speaking, we gather
knowledge about reality, be it scientific or potentially sci-
entific knowledge, according to nowadays classification.
An important point we need to be aware of is that ob-
servation is not interpretation. One thing is to observe
and another thing is to draw conclusions from our obser-
vations; one thing is to describe and another thing is to
explain the content of our descriptions.
Generally speaking, we understand that observation
should be a neutral activity, with no other goals than ob-
servation itself, whereas interpretation should be a much
more scope-oriented activity; the (main) scope of inter-
pretation in science being explanation and, based on ex-
planation, prediction.
Observation is typically associated to the experimental
process of data collection, whereas interpretation is asso-
ciated to the creation of explanatory models and theories.
However, a radical distinction between observation and
interpretation is not possible. There is indeed a lot of
objectivity in our theoretical interpretations of the ex-
perimental data, considering that the evolution of our
scientific theories is founded on a method of critical na-
ture.
But there is also a lot of subjectivity and convention-
ality (i.e., of interpretation) in our alleged objective ob-
servations. This is so because we necessarily see reality
through the lenses of our theories, which determine what,
how, where and when to observe. To quote Mark Twain,
“For whoever has only a hammer, sooner or later every-
thing else will seem like a nail.” The hammer, in Twain’s
metaphor, represents our cognitive filters, our theories
of reality, our paradigms and world-visions, that tell us
what we are supposed to observe and how to do it.
But an even more subtle point is to become aware that
not only our observations are strongly biased by our the-
orizations and, vice versa, our theorizations are strongly
biased by our observations, but also our comprehension
of reality is strongly biased by our understanding of what
an observation is, or is meant to be.
The above remark is of course crucial in all ambits of
human activity. In the present article however, we shall
mostly limit our considerations to physics, drawing on
what are the consequences of a deeper analysis of the
key concept of observation in order to clarify some of
the important interpretational problems of quantum and
classical/relativistic physical theories.
III. OBSERVATION AS AN ACT OF
DISCOVERY
If we open a good dictionary, we can typically read that
an observation is a process through which an observer can
gain (and register) information about objects belonging
to his/her reality. To fix ideas, let us give an example
of a very simple act of observation. Imagine yourself in
a forest. Your eyes are wide open and you simply look
at the trees surrounding you. In other terms, using your
eyes and brain as an observational instrument, you detect
the sunlight reflected by the trees, and by doing so you
gather information about some of their properties, like
for instance their spatial locations, dimensions, variety,
colors, and so on. A crucial point in this observational
activity is that it is completely non-invasive with respect
to the observed entities. You observe the trees but your
observation has no effect on them.
It is probably from observational examples of this sort,
which are typical of the interaction of human beings
with their natural environment, that a sort of prejudice
emerged, that we have the tendency to believe in an al-
most unconscious way: that it is always possible to ob-
serve the countless entities populating our reality without
disturbing them, i.e., without influencing their state and
evolution [34].
The reason for the development of such a prejudice is
quite obvious. We live in a terrestrial environment that
is almost constantly illuminated by the light of our sun or
the indirect light of our moon (and in more recent times
by the artificial light of our appliances). Therefore, the
entities populating our macroscopic reality are constantly
emitting light, be it the light they directly produce or the
light they reflect. This is how we came to know these en-
tities (of course, we are simplifying here, as not only the
visual sense is involved in the discovery of our environ-
ment), so that we usually consider them as being in their
undisturbed condition when they do actually emit direct
or indirect light. Thus, we believe that observing them
is about collecting something they spontaneously offer to
us, as if they were constantly sending messages out to
the world, informing it about their actual condition.
To put it figuratively, it is as if the world was con-
stantly talking to us, without us asking anything specific,
like a person performing a monologue, speaking her/his
thoughts aloud to whoever is willing to listen. And by
doing so, by listening to the messages that are sponta-
neously emitted by the different entities populating our
reality, we are able to discover many of their attributes
and properties. So, we could say that our most basic and
common understanding of the concept of observation is
that to observe an entity is to discover what an entity is,
without affecting its “isness” in whatsoever way.
This way of understanding the concept of observation,
as a pure act of discovery, is also deeply rooted in physics,
in the formalism of classical mechanics, although in an
invisible way. Indeed, since observation is believed to
have no effects on what is being observed, as it is just
an act of discovery of what is already present in a sys-
tem, there is obviously no need to explicitly represent the
observer in a physical theory. Therefore, classical theo-
ries describe the states, properties and the evolution of
physical entities by assuming a priori that such states,
3properties and evolution would be the same, should they
be observed or not observed (i.e., discovered or not dis-
covered) by an observer (typically a human scientist with
her/his experimental apparatus).
IV. ASKING QUESTIONS
But what if reality’s monologue suddenly ceases? Or
what if we are tired to only passively listen to that mono-
logue and want to start a conversation, an interactive
dialogue? Imagine once more being in the forest, but
this time during a moonless night. This means that you
cannot anymore observe the trees, as they are no more
emitting or reflecting a light that your human eyes are
able to detect. If you are nevertheless intentioned to ob-
serve them, you have then to take a more active stance
in your observational process. For instance, you can light
a torch and use it to illuminate the surrounding trees, to
observe their spatial positions.
When you light a torch, you enter the reality’s scene
and transform the monologue into a dialogue. The act
of lightening a torch with the purpose of projecting its
light in the environment, is asking the entities living in
that environment specific questions, whose responses cor-
respond to the light they will diffuse back to you, that
you are then able to detect, i.e., to observe.
Now, as is well known, the pressure exerted by an
electromagnetic source, although extremely feeble, is not
null. Such a pressure (that depends on whether the light
is absorbed or reflected) is certainly not sufficient to exert
any appreciable influence on the macroscopic structure of
massive trees, but the situation dramatically changes in
case one would be interested in observing, and therefore
illuminating, much smaller objects.
That light is able to exert a pressure, and therefore dis-
turb the objects it illuminates, was well-known also be-
fore the advent of quantum physics. However, it wasn’t
considered as a problem, as it was also believed that it
was always possible, at least in principle, to arbitrarily
reduce the intensity of the light source and diminish its
effective disturbance, thus allowing one to observe what-
ever entity – macroscopic or microscopic – without sensi-
bly affecting its condition (using for this a more sensitive
detecting instrument). Coming back to our dialogical
metaphor, the classical assumption is that it is always
possible to not influence the reality’s responses, by sim-
ply whispering our questions and opening wide our ears
to listen to the whispers of its responses.
Heisenberg has been the first to seriously put into
question the validity of such a prejudice, by analyzing
(with the help of Bohr) the functioning of an hypotheti-
cal gamma microscope, used to observe the tiniest possi-
ble entities: electrons [13]. We shall not enter here into
the many subtleties of the analysis of Heisenberg, that
allowed him to provide a first heuristic argument in fa-
vor of his famous uncertainty principle. But let us point
out what could be a possible misunderstanding regarding
the reasons that brought him to conclude that we must
abandon the idea that it is possible to observe an electron
without affecting its state.
The usual argument (simplifying here to the extreme)
goes as follows: because of the quantum nature of light,
which can only transfer energy and momentum in small
indivisible packets, called photons, it is impossible to ar-
bitrarily lower the intensity of a light beam illuminating
an electron, below a certain level, seeing that the lowest
possible intensity corresponds to the transfer of a single
photon, and that a single photon still carries with it a
certain finite amount of energy and momentum, and will
thus produce a non-negligible effect of disturbance on a
tiny electron.
This however is not entirely exact, as nothing really
prevents us from arbitrarily lowering the intensity of a
light beam, if we really want to. In fact, this can be done
by lowering not only the number of photons that are po-
tentially transferred per unit time, but also by lowering
the frequency of these photons, i.e., the frequency of the
light beam. So, even though the nature of light is quan-
tum, one can still produce, at least in principle, a light
beam of arbitrarily low intensity, that will cause a negli-
gible disturbance even to a tiny electron.
So, why Heisenberg, in his famous gedankenexperi-
mente, insisted in only using high-frequency gamma pho-
tons? The reason is well known: he was not only inter-
ested in asking the electron a specific question, regarding
its position in space, but was also determined in obtain-
ing from it a precise answer. And since the resolution of
an optical instrument is proportional to the wavelength
of the used radiation, to obtain such a precise answer he
was forced to stick to gamma photons, carrying a poten-
tially non-negligible disturbance over electrons.
What Heisenberg thus realized is that when we pretend
from reality a very accurate reply to our interrogatives,
we are not anymore guaranteed that these interrogatives
will be without consequences on what is being observed.
In other terms, we are not anymore guaranteed in that
case that our observations are reduced to non-invasive
acts of pure discovery.
V. OBSERVATION AS AN ACT OF
DESTRUCTION
A common prejudice is to believe that the problem
highlighted by Heisenberg with his analysis of the gamma
microscope is only pertinent to the micro-world. In other
terms, it is usually believed that the inevitable and ir-
reducible disturbance of the observer on the observed
(the so-called observer effect) is only one of the many
strangeness of the micro-world, but that nothing of the
sort can truly happen in our everyday macroscopic real-
ity. What the present author believes instead, is that the
real strangeness is the fact that we had to wait for Heisen-
berg to realize that our observations, whether concerning
microscopic or macroscopic entities, cannot be reduced to
4mere acts of discovery. Observations are much more than
that.
Indeed, one thing is to observe reality with a priori no
ideas of what we are going to observe, and another thing
is to become much more scope oriented in our observa-
tional processes, deciding in advance what we want to
observe and making sure that we will be able to gather
some precise information about it. Then, observation
cannot anymore be understood as a purely non-invasive
discovery activity.
As a paradigmatic example, consider a small piece of
wood [35] and imagine that you want to observe its burn-
ability, that is, its property of being a burnable piece of
matter. When you take such a decision, you are not any-
more just collecting information that is spontaneously
offered to you by the wooden entity, passively listening
to its monologue, but are now dramatically entering the
scene by asking a very specific question and, more im-
portantly, pretending a very specific answer.
Asking such a question, and being assured to receive
from the piece of wood entity a definite answer, requires
to act on it in a very specific way, which will depend
on your adopted definition for the concept of burnability.
Burnability, as we all know, is the capacity of a body, in
certain conditions, to combine with oxygen to produce
heat. There are of course different possible ways (and
levels of sophistication) to define the burnability prop-
erty of an entity [36]. But for the sake of our discussion,
it will be sufficient to adopt the following very simple
definition: “A physical entity is burnable if, when we
put it in contact with the flame of a match, for 30 sec-
onds, such a contact will trigger a reaction that causes
the disintegration of the entity.”
Having defined what we mean by burnability, we are
now in a position to observe it in our piece of wood entity.
Obviously, there is only one possible way to perform such
an observation: one has to take the entity, put it in con-
tact with the flame of a match for 30 seconds, and check
if this will produce its disintegration. If it is the case,
then we can say that we have succeeded in observing its
burnability, otherwise, that we have failed to observe it.
To summarize, if we want to observe something spe-
cific, and not simply uncritically collect what reality of-
fers to us, then we have to become much more active in
our observational processes and ask specific questions (in
the present case the question is: “Is the piece of wood
entity burnable?”). To receive a response to our ques-
tions we must implement them in operational terms, i.e.,
perform specific experiments. And when we do so, we
may receive from the entity under investigation a positive
or a negative answer, according to whether the observa-
tion will be successful (confirmed) or unsuccessful (un-
confirmed) [37]. However, such a dialogue cannot any-
more be considered as a non-invasive discovery activity,
as it may have dramatic consequences for the entity un-
der observation, which may deliver its answer as a swan
singing its last beautiful song!
VI. OBSERVATION AS AN ACT OF CREATION
In the previous sections we have considered two oppo-
site forms of observation. One purely non-invasive, like
when we stare at the trees in a forest, corresponding to a
pure act of discovery, and one totally invasive, like when
we observe the burnability of a piece of wood and by do-
ing so we destroy the property, together with the entity
that possesses it.
The invasive, destructive process of observation is as-
sociated, as we have seen, with our choice of taking a
more active part in the reality’s drama, by asking spe-
cific questions and pretending precise answers. However,
the destruction of the property which is being observed
is not necessarily the rule and the opposite may occur
as well: it may happen that we create the very property
we are meant to observe! This may appear as a more
perplexing statement, but this is only so because we are
not usually aware of the fact that our acts of creation
can also be considered as acts of observations, and vice
versa.
To illustrate our purpose, let us consider an example
taken from human interactions. Human beings can man-
ifest different psychological states, characterized by spe-
cific properties. Let us consider for instance suspicious-
ness. When a person is suspicious (i.e., when the prop-
erty of suspiciousness is actual for that person) it will
usually exhibit a certain number of behaviors, typical of
that condition, like for instance the one of looking to
other people with a certain insistence. Let us take such
a characteristic behavior as a rough characterization of
the property of suspiciousness. Imagine then that you
enter into a place, say a tearoom, and want to observe
the suspiciousness of the persons therein. Assume that
you know from other sources that these persons are not,
in that precise moment, manifesting any suspiciousness.
However, when you start observing them very attentively,
to detect their possible suspiciousness, your behavior will
appear suspicious to them, so that in turn they may pos-
sibly start looking at you with a certain insistence. Ac-
cordingly, you might conclude from your observation that
some of the persons in the tearoom are manifesting sus-
piciousness.
This example is interesting as it reveals that we are
not always aware that in certain instances we may be the
very creators of what we believe we are instead just dis-
covering. A possible objection here could be that sentient
beings may behave differently than inanimate entities, as
we also admitted in the footnote of Section III. To meet
that objection, let us consider a different example.
Consider a small solid object of whatever shape, made
of a non-elastic material, and imagine that you want to
observe its incompressibility, which for the purpose of the
present example we shall define as follows: “A physical
entity is incompressible if, when submitted to the action
of a machine press exerting a pressure of 10, 000 pascal,
it experiences a volume change of no more than 1% of its
initial volume.”
5When we perform the above observation, i.e., when
we submit the entity to the 10, 000 pascal of pressure in
the press, the result can either be successful or unsuc-
cessful, according to the material the entity is made of
and its shape. In the case the outcome of the observa-
tion is successful, which means that following the action
of the press the entity’s volume change is less than 1%,
we can conclude that we have effectively observed the
incompressibility of the entity. However, we certainly
cannot affirm that the observational process has created
the incompressibility, as the property was clearly already
possessed by the entity before the observation was carried
out.
But what if we fail to observe the incompressibility, i.e.,
what if the entity’s reduction of volume is greater than
1%? Then, in this case, we can conclude that prior to
our observation the entity wasn’t incompressible, as our
observation confirmed. However, we must also conclude
that following our observation the entity has acquired the
property of being incompressible. Indeed, should we de-
cide to perform again the test, then we know in advance,
with certainty, that the outcome of the observation would
be successful. This is because to observe the incompress-
ibility property we had to compress the entity, and a
(non-elastic) compressed entity is also an incompressible
entity, according to our definition of incompressibility.
In other terms, we must conclude that our observational
process has created the very property it was meant to
observe.
This may appear a little bizarre, as by failing to ob-
serve the incompressibility, the effect of our observation
is nevertheless the creation of incompressibility, but this
is how things are, and we must thus conclude that an ob-
servation can very well create what is being observed, not
only in the domain of psychological interactions between
humans, but also in the domain of interactions between
inanimate entities.
In fact, we can also easily create examples where the
observation doesn’t need to fail, to create the prop-
erty which is being observed. Consider for this a two-
dimensional point-like classical particle of negative elec-
tric charge, and imagine you want to observe its horizon-
tal spatial position. Assume that scientists living in this
unusual universe can only observe horizontal positions
by employing strange sawtooth rulers (see Fig.1), whose
cavities are positively electrically charged. The observa-
tional procedure is as follows: “Place the sawtooth ruler
along the horizontal axis below the particle, then wait
until the particle is drawn into one of the ruler’s cavities,
whose position will then give the measured horizontal
position for the particle.”
Clearly, apart from the very special circumstances
when the particle is already placed in perfect correspon-
dence to the center of one of the ruler’s cavities, the above
observational procedure does literally create the horizon-
tal position it observes (i.e., measures).
FIG. 1: Observing the horizontal position of a point particle
using a sawtooth ruler.
VII. CLASSIFYING OBSERVATIONS
CONSIDERING THEIR EFFECTS
So far, we have only considered the effects of a process
of observation in relation to the specific property that
is being observed, but of course an observation can po-
tentially affect (create or destroy) not only the property
which is under consideration, but also other properties
that the observed entity possesses, and this can be the
case also when the observation is of the discovery kind.
Let us come back to our piece of wood entity and imag-
ine we want to observe its floatability. Assume that we
define floatability as follows: “A physical entity floats if,
when it is totally immersed into the water, it experiences
an upward (buoyancy) force greater than its weight, caus-
ing it to reemerge from the water.”
Of course, a piece of wood entity, if made of nor-
mal (not too dense) wood, does possess the floatability
property, which therefore can be successfully observed.
Contrary to burnability, the observational process of the
floatability property is not destructive for the entity. In-
deed, at the end of the observational process we still have
an integral piece of wood. Also, the observation of floata-
bility doesn’t destroy floatability, as is clear from the fact
that, if one would decide to perform again the observa-
tion, the positive result would be once more certain in
advance. However, we cannot say that the test is totally
non-invasive for what concerns other properties possessed
by the wooden entity, as is clear from the fact that its
dryness property is obviously (temporarily) destroyed by
the observational procedure.
Let us summarize our findings up to here. We have
seen that an observation is a multifaceted process and
that we can distinguish different categories of observa-
tion. Some observations involve a pure discovery aspect,
with respect to what is being observed, whereas others
involve pure creation or destruction aspects.
The observations involving a pure discovery aspect can
6be divided into two categories. We have the category of
non-invasive discovery observations, that leave the ob-
served entity totally unaffected, like when we observe
the trees in a forest by collecting the light they sponta-
neously offer to us. And we have the category of invasive
discovery observations, that leave the observed property
unaffected, like when one observes the floatability of a
piece of wood entity, without affecting it, but temporar-
ily destroying other properties, like its dryness.
Then, we have the observational processes that involve
pure aspects of creation or destruction of what is being
observed. These are of course all invasive processes. An
invasive creation observation is a process that creates
the property it observes (and possibly also affects other
properties of the observed entity), like when we observe
the suspiciousness of a human being, the incompressibil-
ity of a non-elastic object, or the horizontal position of a
point-particle using a sawtooth ruler. On the other hand,
an invasive destruction observation is a process that de-
stroys the property it observes (and possibly also affect
other properties of the observed entity), like when we
observe the burnability of a piece of wood.
VIII. THE CLASSICAL PREJUDICE
In the previous section we have classified observations
taking into account the possible effects they may pro-
duce on what is being observed. We want now to con-
sider observations in relation to their predictability. The
question one can ask is if the outcome of a given observa-
tional process is in principle predictable with certainty,
or not. According to the so-called classical prejudice [1–
3], the outcomes of all observational processes should be
in principle predictable. As we shall show, such a prej-
udice is false, but before doing so, let us re-examine the
different examples of observations we have considered in
the previous sections, in the perspective of predictability.
When we observe the trees in a forest, we can easily
predict in advance their spatial locations, dimensions, va-
riety and colors, if for example we possess a detailed map
of the place. Such a map is a description of the state of
the forest, and it can easily be obtained from information
gathered from previous observations.
For what concerns the burnability and floatability
properties of a piece of wood entity, again we can easily
predict in advance the successful outcome of these obser-
vations. This is so because we have asked the same ques-
tions to countless wooden entities in the past, and have
always received from them affirmative answers. Alterna-
tively, we can infer these outcomes from a detailed anal-
ysis of the chemical and physical properties of wooden
materials. But whatever is the method we employ to
gather our knowledge about the wooden entity, the point
is that we are perfectly able to predict in advance, with
certainty, the effect of the burnability and floatability ob-
servational processes.
The same we can also say, of course, for the obser-
vation of the incompressibility of a non-elastic material.
Knowing in advance the characteristics of the material
certainly allows us to predict if the observation will be
successful or not.
Also, our ability to predict with certainty the result
of the observation of the position of a point-like particle,
using a sawtooth ruler, only depends on our prior knowl-
edge of the location of the particle, and more exactly
on the precision with which we know its prior location.
And since nothing prevents us from predetermining, with
arbitrary precision, the spatial coordinates of a classical
point-like particle, it surely is possible, at least in prin-
ciple, to predict in advance the outcome of the sawtooth
ruler observational process [38].
Finally, concerning the predictability of the outcome of
the observation of suspiciousness, the situation is a little
more controversial. Indeed, although a great majority of
humans certainly respond in a very predictable way when
they receive specific stimulis, it is also true that a minor-
ity of them sometimes react in a highly non-predictable
way, independently of the inputs they receive from their
environment. This possibility is sometimes called free
will. Now, if we assume that humans can, in certain cir-
cumstances, make use of their free will, then we cannot
predict with absolute certainty, not even in principle, the
outcome of observational processes performed on them
(be they invasive or non-invasive), like for instance the
observation of suspiciousness.
Apart from the fact that free will is a very controversial
subject, as many thinkers believe it is just an illusion, one
can object once more that living entities are intrinsically
different in comparison to inanimate entities, and that
the true mission of physics is to only study the latter, not
the formers. Therefore, one may ask if by limiting one’s
investigation to the observation of inanimate entities, one
can conclude that, until proven to the contrary, it should
always be possible, at least in principle, to predict the
outcome of whatever observation, hence establishing the
validity of the (deterministic) classical prejudice.
Of course, all quantum physicists know that quantum
mechanics has invalidated such a prejudice, as nobody
seems to be in a position to predict the outcomes of
those observational processes called quantum measure-
ments. However, and contrary to what is usually be-
lieved, the falsity of the classical prejudice has nothing
to do with the specificities of microscopic quantum sys-
tems, but with the way we generally attribute meet prop-
erties to physical entities, and the procedures we have to
employ to observe them.
To see this, we come back to the example of the piece
of wood entity, which was firstly introduced and ana-
lyzed by Aerts as a simple illustration of a macroscopic
physical system for which all the mystery of experimental
incompatibility is under our eyes [4, 16]. As we already
emphasized, a (dry) piece of wood is a burnable entity.
This means that if we decide to observe its burnability,
we can predict with certainty, in advance, that the ob-
servation will be successful. And the same is clearly true
7for floatability.
Let us briefly open a parenthesis to stress that every
time we can in principle predict, with certainty, the suc-
cessful outcome of the observation of a given property,
without the need to execute in practice the observation,
this is equivalent to affirm that such a property is an
actual property of the entity under consideration. On
the other hand, if the prediction is not possible, not even
in principle, then this is to say that the entity doesn’t
possess such a property or, more exactly, that it only
possesses it in a potential sense. Such a definition of the
actuality and potentiality of a physical property has its
origin in the famous Einstein Podolsky and Rosen real-
ity criterion [14], which was subsequently reworked by
Constantin Piron [1–3] to become a key ingredient of the
Geneva-Brussels (realistic) approach to physics. (See also
the discussion in Ref. [15]).
Now, as we said, the piece of wood entity does possess
both properties: burnability and floatability. And this
means that the piece of wood entity does also possess
the meet property of “burnability and floatability” (the
term “meet” is here used as in Boolean algebras), which is
by definition the conjunction of the burnability property
and floatability one. What we are simply stating here
is a general fact about reality, namely that it is always
possible to attribute several properties at once to physical
entities, and since we can do it, then also the property
of possessing two or more properties at once must be a
property of the system [39].
If what we are asserting here is correct, as it un-
doubtedly is, then we should also be in a position to
define meaningful observational processes associated to
meet properties, and in our specific case to clarify what
it means to successfully observe the “burnability and
floatability” meet property.
IX. HOW TO CONJUNCTLY PERFORM
INCOMPATIBLE OBSERVATIONS
As the attentive reader has probably already realized,
reading the article up to here, to observe a given prop-
erty is to test it. Indeed, when we successfully observe
a property, we are doing nothing more than confirm-
ing (although not proving) its actuality. So, observing
the “burnability and floatability” meet property is about
finding a single experimental procedure that would allow
us to conjunctly test both properties.
This may appear impossible at first sight. Indeed, the
observation of floatability is destructive with respect to
burnability, as is clear from the fact that a wet piece
of wood doesn’t burn anymore, according to our defini-
tion of burnability. In the same way, a burned piece of
wood doesn’t float any more, as ashes usually dissolve
or precipitate when immersed in water. What we are
saying is that the burnability and floatability observa-
tional processes are mutually incompatibles. This should
not surprise us more than necessary, if we just remember
that we are speaking of invasive observational processes,
that do affect the state and intrinsic properties of the
observed entity.
Let us not forget that the majority of our actions are
invasive, and because of their invasiveness, they are gen-
erally incompatibles, in the sense that the effect of per-
forming a given action A (like putting on a sock) fol-
lowed by another action B (like putting on a shoe) is
not in general the same as performing first the action B
followed by action A. Most of our observations being in-
vasive processes, they will necessarily exhibit mutual in-
compatibilities, as it is the case of quantum observations
(measurements), associated to non-commuting quantum
observables.
So, seeing that the observation of burnability is incom-
patible with the observation of floatability, how can we
conjunctly observe them? In other terms, what does it
mean to observe (or test) the “burnability and floatabil-
ity” meet property? The answer to such a tricky question
was provided many years ago by Constantin Piron [1–3],
by means of a very simple, and at the same time quite
subtle, argument, which we are now going to explain.
Considering that to observe is to test, what we simply
need to find is a valuable test for the “burnability and
floatability” meet property, i.e., a test that would check,
on a single piece of wood, the actuality of both properties
(and therefore observe both at once). Such a test, which
is usually called a product test (or product question, that
we shall call here product observation), consists in doing
the following: “First make a non-deterministic choice re-
garding which one of the two observations you are going
to perform, either the burnability or the floatability one,
then perform it. If it is successful, you will say that also
the product observation has been successful, i.e., that
you succeeded in conjunctly observing the burnability
and floatability properties.”
To understand why the above argument is correct, one
must keep in mind what we have previously emphasized:
that an entity does actually possess a property if and
only if it is (in principle) possible to predict, with cer-
tainty, that its observation would yield a successful re-
sult, should we decide to perform it. The key point to
understand is that we don’t need to perform in practice
the observation to infer the actuality of a property. It is
only sufficient to be (in principle) in a position to predict
with certainty the outcome of the observational process.
Now, seeing that the product test procedure involves
a non-deterministic choice, i.e., a choice whose outcome,
by definition, cannot be predicted in advance by the ob-
server, not even in principle, the only way s/he can guar-
antee that the observation would be successful, should it
be performed, is to know in advance that its success is
independent of such non-deterministic choice. And this
can only be the case if the two properties – the burn-
ability and floatability properties in our case – are both
actual.
So, although most of our observational processes are
incompatible, as they correspond to invasive procedures,
8this doesn’t mean we cannot define a meaningful proce-
dure to observe (i.e., test) meet properties. But for this,
we need to add to our observational processes a non-
deterministic ingredient.
For many readers the above reasoning may appear a
little weird. This is because we are not used to think of
our observations as experimental tests. But this is what,
in ultimate analysis, goal oriented observations are all
about: a way to check the existence (i.e., the actuality)
of certain elements of reality, usually called properties (by
discovering, creating or destroying them). And since in
our reality entities can have more than a single property
at once (this is how we construct reality!), it would be in
fact much more weird if there wouldn’t exist any possi-
bility to test (i.e., to observe) such a state of affair [40].
X. THE NON-DETERMINISTIC CHOICE
THEOREM
It is now time to come back to the classical prejudice
and prove its falsity. More precisely, we have the
following result.
Theorem: If meet properties are testable, then physical
systems can behave non-deterministically.
In other terms, the theorem affirms that if the fact that
entities can possess many different properties at once is
testable (i.e., observable), then the classical prejudice is
false. To prove it, we must remember that to observe a
property formed by the conjunction of two or more prop-
erties, one needs to employ a product observation, which
by definition requires a non-deterministic act of choice,
i.e., a choice that the observer cannot predict in advance.
So, if we assume that meet properties are testable prop-
erties, we must also assume that observers are able to
perform purely non-deterministic choices. To show that
this implies that physical systems, under certain condi-
tions, can behave non-deterministically, let us consider a
specific example of a property whose observation cannot
be predicted in advance, not even in principle.
For this, consider the non-burnability property, which
we define by means of the same observational procedure
as for the burnability one, with the only difference that an
unsuccessful outcome for the latter corresponds to a suc-
cessful outcome for the former, and vice versa. Then, let
us consider the “non-burnability and floatability” meet
property, i.e., the property of an entity to both possess
the non-burnability and floatability properties, and ask
the following question: “Does the piece of wood entity
possess such a meet property?”
Clearly, we cannot predict the outcome of the prod-
uct observation associated to that question, not even in
principle. Indeed, if it is the floatability test which will
be chosen, the outcome will be successful, whereas if it is
the non-burnability test that will be chosen, the outcome
will be unsuccessful. In other terms, the observer cannot
predict in advance the behavior (i.e., the response) of
the piece of wood system, when s/he observes the “non-
burnability and floatability” meet property (i.e., asks a
product question). S/he cannot do it even in principle, as
the random choice element is an integral part of the very
definition of the observational procedure, and cannot be
eliminated without affecting the nature of the observed
property. And this means that, whenever a meet prop-
erty of this kind is observed, a physical entity as simple as
a piece of wood is be able to exhibit a non-deterministic
behavior.
It is worth noting that the above theorem simply ex-
presses the fact that there is a structural correspondence
between the behavior of an observer and the behavior
of the observed entity. This is so because if there ex-
ist entities (be them human or not) that can manifest
non-deterministic behaviors, then these entities can be
used to actually perform product observations, through
which meet properties can be observed. When an ob-
server does so, s/he transfers her/his non-deterministic
action to the entity under investigation, which therefore
can also manifest a non-deterministic behavior, at least
whenever certain meet properties are considered, like the
“non-burnability and floatability” one, in the case of a
piece of wood.
The fact that not every observation is a classical (de-
terministic) observation was firstly observed by Piron,
who is the designer of the product test procedure [1–3].
If we have here presented such a result in the form of a
rather pompous “non-deterministic choice theorem,” it
is because of a recent interest concerning the relation-
ship between human “free will” and the “free will” of
microscopic systems, as substantiated in a famous free
will theorem recently proved by John Conway and Si-
mon Kochen [20, 21], stating that if experimenters can
perform free choices, then the same must hold true for
certain physical systems, like those formed by spin-1 twin
particles.
It is interesting to note that Conway and Kochen
proved their theorem assuming (among other things)
that under certain conditions (spacelike separation) our
choices cannot affect the outcomes of certain experi-
ments. On the other hand, the above non-deterministic
choice theorem is based on the elementary observation
that, on the contrary, the outcomes of our experimental
observations are strongly dependent on our choices.
XI. THE PROBLEM OF CONTROL
According to the above non-deterministic choice theo-
rem, if we assume that meet properties are observables
(i.e., testable) then the classical prejudice must be false.
Therefore, there exist observational processes whose out-
comes cannot be predicted in advance, not even in prin-
ciple. This means that, in addition to our previous classi-
fication of Section VII (where observations were divided
according to their effects), we can also divide observa-
9tions according to their predictability, i.e., according to
the fact that their outcomes are in principle predictable
in advance, or not.
We want to now further persue our general analysis of
the observational processes, and elucidate what could be
a possible mechanism at the origin of the unpredictability
of certain physical systems, like quantum systems, whose
behavior, apparently, can only be described in probabilis-
tic terms.
An important point we have so far clarified is that
many of our observations involve aspects of transforma-
tion, which can either consist in the creation or the de-
struction of what is being observed, or of some other
properties possessed by the entity under investigation.
When we talk about transformations, one of the things
that comes to mind is the issue of control. Do we control
our creation/destruction processes, or don’t we? Having
control is about having the knowledge and the power to
exert a specific action in order to precisely produce the
desired effect.
If we come back to our dialogical analogy, having con-
trol is asking a question in a way that we can perfectly
predict what will be the reply. It is not only about pre-
tending an accurate reply from our interlocutor (as when
Heisenberg asked about the exact position of an electron,
using a gamma microscope), but also about obtaining a
pre-determined reply, with certainty.
Up to now, in our discussion, we have implicitly as-
sumed that the observer has always a full control of
her/his actions. For instance, we have assumed that s/he
is able to immerse the piece of wood in a water vessel
without knocking over the vessel, when s/he observes its
floatability. Or that s/he will not change her/his mind
during the execution of a certain experiment, leaving the
observation half done, and therefore without any mean-
ingful outcome! Certainly, we can always make sure to
exert a full control over our observational processes, for as
long as they involve simple and robust interactions. This
however cannot be the case when we ask sophisticated
product questions, requiring the use of non-deterministic
choices which, by definition, are beyond our control.
Another possibility is that the observational process
involves a hidden mechanism which would be responsible
for the selection of a specific outcome; a mechanism that
the observer would be totally unable to control, for a
question of lack of knowledge and power. It is important
to emphasize that we are not talking here about a lack
of knowledge concerning the state of the observed entity
(as it is assumed in certain hidden variables theories),
but about the interaction between the observer (or the
observer’s measuring apparatus) and the observed entity.
In other terms, we are distinguishing here a situation of
possible incomplete knowledge of the state of the entity
from a more subtle situation of lack of knowledge about
the actual interaction that arises between the observing
and the observed entity (which can also be understood
as a lack of control by the observer over some aspects of
the procedure of observation).
Clearly, if because of some hidden mechanism the ob-
server cannot fully control the interaction, s/he will not
be in a position to predict with certainty the outcome of
the observation, which therefore s/he will only be able
to describe, at best, in probabilistic terms. Can this ex-
plain the appearance of (non-Kolmogorovian) probabili-
ties in typical quantum mechanical measurements? This
is certainly possible, as Diederik Aerts demonstrated in
his hidden measurement approach [7, 11], showing that
to a given quantum non-deterministic observation one
can always associate a collection of “hidden” determinis-
tic interactions (called hidden measurements by Aerts),
and that when the observation is performed (on an en-
tity in a given state), one of these hidden interactions is
selected and actually takes place. In other terms, accord-
ing to this view, quantum probabilities would find their
origin in the observer’s lack of knowledge (or control)
about which one of these hidden (deterministic) interac-
tions does effectively take place during the observational
process.
In fact, the hidden-measurement mechanism is much
more general than that, as it can be used to describe any
probabilistic situation, and not only the quantum one.
This means that it gives, in a way, a full description for
what concerns the type of probability structures we can
encounter in our world, as was proven in Section 4 of [23].
XII. THE (SPIN) QUANTUM MACHINE
Particularly important in the analysis of Aerts has
been the possibility of substantiating his explanatory
framework by means of a number of explicit macroscopic
models, which can exhibit classical, quantum and inter-
mediate behaviors, by simply varying the observer’s level
of control over the mechanism which is responsible for
the selection of a specific interaction. One of the most
famous of his examples is the (spin) quantum machine,
that we are going to now briefly describe [6, 7, 18].
The physical entity under observation is a simple point-
particle, localized on the surface of a three-dimensional
Euclidean sphere of diameter L, the different possible
states of which being the different places the point-
particle can occupy. The particularity of the model re-
sides in the way observations are carried out. Indeed,
to observe the state (i.e., the position) of the entity, the
experimental protocol is to use a sticky uniform elastic
band, to be stripped along a given orientation ρ, between
two diametrically opposed points, p− and p+, on the
sphere’s surface. Each chosen orientation ρ for the elastic
(defining a specific couple of end-points on the sphere’s
surface) characterizes a different observation with two
possible outcomes.
The experimental procedure is to let the point-particle
fall from its original location orthogonally onto the elas-
tic band, and stick to it. The emplacement of the particle
stuck on the elastic thus defines two lengths, L±, corre-
sponding to the particle’s distances to the end-points p±.
10
Then, one waits until the elastic breaks, at some unpre-
dictable point, so that the particle, which is attached to
one of the two pieces of it, will be pulled either toward
p+ or toward p+, yielding in this way the specific out-
come of the experiment, i.e., the spatial state which is
acquired by the particle-entity as a result of the observa-
tional process (the different steps of the observation are
schematically described in Figure 2).
FIG. 2: A schematic representation of the quantum machine
observational process, in the plane of the 3-dimensional sphere
where it takes place.
With the help of some elementary trigonometry, it is
easy to calculate the probabilities of the different possible
outcomes. Indeed, the probability that the particle ends
up in point p± is given by the length L± of the piece of
elastic between the particle and the end-point, divided by
the total length L = L+ + L− of the elastic. Then, if γ
is the angle indicated in Figure 2, between the direction
of point p+ with respect to the origin of the sphere and
the direction associated to the particle’s initial position,
we have that the probabilities for the outcomes p± are
given by:
P± = L±
L
=
1
2
(1± cos γ) =
{
cos2 γ2
sin2 γ2 .
(1)
The above are exactly the quantum probabilities one
would obtain in a typical Stern-Gerlach measurement
with a spin-1/2 quantum entity, with ρ corresponding to
the chosen orientation of the Stern-Gerlach apparatus,
defining the two possible directions for the spin measure-
ment, and γ the angle between the apparatus’ orientation
and the direction of the prepared incoming spin state
[6, 7, 18].
So, the observational process of Aerts’ quantum ma-
chine is perfectly isomorphic to the observational process
of a spin-1/2 quantum entity. This means that, thanks
to his model, it is possible to make fully evident, in our
conventional 3-dimensional theatre, the hidden structure
associated to the description of a two-dimensional quan-
tum system, allowing to gain a better understanding
about what really goes on (structurally speaking) when
the quantum level of our reality interacts with our equip-
ment.
In fact, one can do much more, as it is possible to
construct generalized quantum machines for arbitrary
quantum mechanical entities [11, 23–26], meaning that
the “hidden measurements” explanation can in fact be
adopted to explain the origin of the quantum probabili-
ties for general quantum systems [41].
Aerts’ quantum machine model also allows for the de-
scription of more general structures, beyond the usual
classical and quantum ones. This can be done in the
above example by choosing elastic bands with different
characteristics. Indeed, if the elastics used are uniformly
breakable (as we have assumed here above), then the ob-
server is in a situation of maximum lack of knowledge
about the point where the elastic will break (i.e., in a
situation of maximum lack of control about which inter-
action is going to be actualized between the particle and
the measuring apparatus), and as we have shown in this
case the machine exactly reproduces the quantum prob-
abilities.
On the other hand, if the elastic used can only break in
a single given predetermined point, then it becomes pos-
sible to predict in advance, with certainty, the outcome
of the experiment, and we are in a situation of minimum
lack of knowledge (maximum control of the observation),
giving rise to a classical, purely deterministic description.
But one can also consider intermediate cases, where
the elastics used are uniformly breakable only on some
of their segments. This corresponds to a generalization
of the quantum machine, called the -model [6], yielding
more complex probability descriptions, neither classical
nor quantum, but genuinely intermediate, correspond-
ing to situations of intermediate knowledge, or control
(more will be said about intermediate observations in
Section XV).
Aerts’ quantum machine provides a simple and con-
vincing mechanism explaining quantum probabilities as
epistemic probabilities, originating from our lack of con-
trol/knowledge about what happens exactly during the
observational process, i.e., during the interaction between
the observer (also understood as the measuring appara-
tus) and the observed. More precisely, thanks to Aerts’
machine, we can see that a quantum measurement is an
observation that involves the selection of a specific ob-
servational process among a number of “hidden” obser-
vational processes (i.e., of “hidden interactions”), which
in the model correspond to the classical (invasive) ob-
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servations (involving an aspect of creation) associated to
the different points x at which the uniform elastic band
can break.
More precisely, if Ou,ρ is a given observation, char-
acterized by a specific orientation ρ of the uniform (u)
elastic, we can associate it with a set of “hidden” ob-
servations Ox,ρ, x ∈ [0, L], where x specifies a possible
breaking point of the elastic. In other terms, Ou,ρ does
not correspond to an actual observation, but to a collec-
tion of potential deterministic observations, one of which
will be selected during the execution of the experimental
procedure, in a way that is beyond the power control of
the participative scientist.
Therefore, we can say that a typical quantum observa-
tion (i.e., a quantum measurement) is a product observa-
tion, involving a symmetry breaking mechanism through
which an actual observation is selected among a number
of potential observations, in a way that cannot be con-
trolled (and therefore predicted) by the observer. If we
can speak here of a process of symmetry breaking it is
because all the “hidden” potential observations have the
same a priori chance to be actualized, as the elastic is
assumed to be uniform.
It is interesting to remark that if quantum measure-
ments are product observations, this also means that
they correspond to observations of meet properties. In
Aerts’ quantum machine we have simply called such a
meet property the position of the point-particle, but to
be more precise, we should have called it the position of
the point-particle observed using a uniform elastic band
stripped along orientation ρ, which in short we can simply
call the (u, ρ)-position of the point-particle. This (u, ρ)-
position can be understood as the meet property formed
by the conjunction of (x, ρ)-position properties, where a
(x, ρ)-position is the position observed by means of an
elastic band stripped along orientation ρ, that will break
with certainty at point x. So, the quantum observation
of the (u, ρ)-position is a product of deterministic obser-
vations of (x, ρ)-positions, realized by means of elastics
that can break only at specific points.
Now, the interest of explicit models like the quantum
machine is that, among other things, they allow us to see
what is usually hidden. Indeed, in the model we can for
instance easily replace the non-deterministic observation
of the (u, ρ)-position by a deterministic observation of
the (x, ρ)-position, by simply performing the experiment
with an elastic which only breaks at point x, instead of
a uniform one. This means that if we should want to, we
could take full control of the observational process, and
predict in advance its outcome.
This however we cannot do (at least for the time be-
ing) when dealing with microscopic systems. When we
observe for instance the spin of a spin-1/2 quantum en-
tity, by means of a Stern-Gerlach apparatus, we know
that, structurally speaking, we can understand it as a
product observation, with a symmetry breaking mecha-
nism operating “behind the scenes.” But we don’t know
what are exactly these hidden (potential) observations in
the case of microscopic entities, that would be responsi-
ble for the emergence of the non-Kolmogorovian quan-
tum probabilities. The hidden measurement approach
just tells us what to search, but not what to find: we
have to search not for hidden variables associated to the
state of the entity, but for hidden variables associated
to the observational process, i.e., to the “pure” (possibly
deterministic) observational processes which are selected
through a symmetry breaking mechanism that cannot be
controlled by the participative scientist.
XIII. INTRINSIC VS RELATIONAL
OBSERVATIONS
In the previous section we have described Aerts’ quan-
tum machine model and interpreted its observational
processes as products of deterministic “hidden” observa-
tions. Although we don’t know to what these “hidden”
observations would correspond to, in the case of micro-
scopic entities, Aerts’ model has certainly the merit of
lifting one corner of the veil of quantum mystery, demys-
tifying part of quantum strangeness.
According to the non-deterministic choice theorem of
Section X, we have seen that, strictly speaking, we must
renounce the old classical prejudice, as it is always possi-
ble to create product questions such that their answers,
by definition, cannot be predicted in advance. On the
other hand, we have also seen that quantum measure-
ments have the structure of product questions. This ex-
plains why their outcomes can only be predicted in prob-
abilistic terms. But this also leaves the door open as to
the possibility of their deconstruction in terms of deter-
ministic sub-observational processes.
So, if on one hand the analysis of the general structure
of the questions we are allowed to address to reality force
us to abandon the deterministic prejudice, on the other
hand we are certainly not forced to abandon it because
of quantum mechanics, as one can understand quantum
observations as products of deterministic observations,
implemented by a symmetry breaking mechanism.
This said, we are now going to analyze observations
according to another important criterion: intrinsicness.
To introduce this concept, let us ask what would happen
if, after some time, we would repeat the observation of
the (u, ρ)-position of the point-particle in the quantum
machine model. Assuming that in Aerts’ toy universe the
point-particle is a static entity, not moving by itself, then
the repetition of the same observation Ou,ρ would yield
exactly the same outcome, because once a specific (u, ρ)-
position is observed (created), it will clearly remain an
intrinsic stable property of the point-particle entity.
The situation is similar to those we have already con-
sidered in Section VI, in relation to the observation of the
incompressibility of a non-elastic object, or of the hori-
zontal position of a point-particle as measured by a saw-
tooth ruler (assuming also in this case that the particle
is motionless). In all these examples, once the property
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is observed, it can also be re-observed in the future, with
certainty, should one perform again exactly the same ob-
servation. And this means that the property in question
has become an intrinsic property of the entity, i.e., a
property that is stably actual for it, and will remain so
until it will be destroyed by some subsequent invasive
process [like for instance the observation of the (u, σ)-
position, with σ 6= ρ, in the quantum machine example].
In fact, also burnability is an intrinsic property of a
wooden entity, although in this case we cannot observe
it in practical terms, for more than once, as the obser-
vational process is destructive. But what is important,
for the purpose of the definition of intrinsicness, is not
if we can perform a number of times the same obser-
vation and always collect the same positive answer (as
this is only possible for observational processes involving
discovery or creation aspects), but that the affirmative
answer would always be certain, regardless of the instant
we may choose to make the observation.
To make our point about intrinsicness more explicit, let
us consider a classical body A that moves along a given
trajectory in the three-dimensional Euclidean space. We
consider the property PA(x0) of A of being located at
x0 ∈ R3 (if A is not point-like, then x0 refers to the
position of its center of mass). Is PA(x0) an intrinsic
property of A?
Even by assuming that the observational process is
purely non-invasive, i.e., that we can observe the posi-
tion of A without disturbing it (we don’t use here uncon-
ventional observational instruments like sawtooth rulers
or sticky elastic bands), the answer is clearly negative.
Indeed, if, say, A only reaches point x0 at time t0, then,
for all t 6= t0, the observation of property PA(x0) would
yield a negative answer. But even at time t0 the answer
could be negative, if for instance the observer decides to
translate in space its measuring apparatus, say to a point
c, so that in relation to the translated reference frame the
position of A at time t0 would become x0 − c, and not
x0. For these reasons, PA(x0) cannot be considered an
intrinsic property of A.
Consider then the property PA(R3) of A of being
present somewhere in the three-dimensional Euclidean
space (i.e., the property of A of being a spatial entity).
If we ask the same question as before, the answer is now
clearly affirmative: PA(R3) is an intrinsic property of A,
as we can predict with certainty the positions it will oc-
cupy at any time (by solving the equations of motion),
so that we know with certainty that at any time it will
be somewhere in space, this being true independently of
the kind of trajectory followed by A and of the reference
frame that will be adopted by the observer.
But then, what is the fundamental difference between
property PA(x0) and property PA(R3), that allows us
to decree that the former is an ephemeral, non-intrinsic
property, that can only be associated to A for a moment,
and only in relation to a specific observer, whereas the
latter is an intrinsic property, that can be permanently
attached to it, for all observers?
The answer is quite evident: PA(x0) is a relational
property, whereas PA(R3) is not. Indeed, the spatial po-
sition x0 of A can only be defined in relation to a spe-
cific observer, associated to a given reference frame. But
without any reference to a specific observer, to possess a
specific spatial position is clearly an undefined, meaning-
less property. So, when we speak about a specific position
of A, in reality we are speaking about a specific (spatial)
relation between A and the observer’s frame of reference.
In other terms, strictly speaking PA(x0) is not a property
of entity A per se, but a property of the composite entity
formed by the combination of entity A and the observer’s
reference frame.
Now, a relational property cannot be an intrinsic prop-
erty, seeing that it is a property associated to a specific
configuration of the composite system formed by the ob-
server and the observed, and as soon as such a configu-
ration is modified (i.e., the specific relation between the
two subsystems is broken), the relational property im-
mediately ceases to be actual. In other terms, we must
distinguish between properties that entities can have in-
dependently of a specific observer, and therefore can be
observed by any observer, from those only expressing an
exclusive, contingent relation between the entity and a
given observer.
Let us open a parenthesis to emphasize that every ob-
servation is, in ultimate analysis, a product observation.
In the case of the observation of the position of A, be-
fore actually performing the observation we clearly have
to choose a specific reference frame, among an infinite
number of potential reference frames. The procedure is
therefore similar to that of a product observation, that
we have described in Section IX, the only difference be-
ing that now the observer perfectly knows which choice
s/he is making, so that, with respect to that choice, the
outcome of the observation can be predicted in advance,
at least in principle.
But knowing which choice is being made doesn’t mean
to have control over the procedure that produces such
choice. This reflection may appear a little strange, as we
are used in physics to only consider situations where the
physical system and the measuring apparatus are already
given. And this is the reason why we usually so strongly
believe in determinism. If everything is given, then there
is no known reasons to think that the result of the ob-
servational process, if properly conducted, wouldn’t be
pre-determined, whatever the outcome will be.
But the assumption that the experimental apparatus
is given a priori cannot be justified in all circumstances.
Indeed, as we have seen, when we observe meet proper-
ties (and more particularly meet properties associated to
incompatible observables), it is part of the very observa-
tional procedure to operate a choice of an unpredictable
nature, to select the experiment that has to be conducted.
Therefore, the apparatus are not always given a priori,
and this is the reason why the (deterministic) classical
prejudice doesn’t hold in general (see also the discussion
in Ref. [3], page 11).
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This said, let us consider once more the observation of
the position of A, and ask the following question: Is it
an observation involving a discovery aspect, or a creation
aspect? Seeing that we have assumed that the detection
of the object is done without producing any disturbance
on it, we would be tempted to answer that the obser-
vational process only involves a (non-invasive) discovery
aspect. However, we must not forget that position is
a relational property, associated to the compound entity
formed by entity A plus the reference frame, and that the
observational process, to be actually performed, requires
the choice of a specific reference frame.
Now, although we are used to think of frames of ref-
erence in abstract terms, in practice a reference frame
is made manifest by the actual presence in space of a
physical observer, be it a human observer or a human
observer’s measuring apparatus. Let us think of it as a
rigid body R, to which we have associated a given co-
ordinate system. Then, choosing an observational frame
means choosing a specific state for R. And this choice
will immediately create certain positions rather than oth-
ers for A, in the course of its evolution. This is because,
as we explained, the specific spatial positions of A are
not intrinsic properties, but relational ones. And if we
consider them in relation to R, then a position x of A
at, say, time t, is in reality an internal property of the
composite system {A,R}: a relational property between
its two subsystems A and R.
When we choose a specific state for the observational
frame R, to carry out the position observation, what we
do is to invasively act on the composite system {A,R},
changing the internal relation between its components.
In other terms, we deform the system {A,R}, and obvi-
ously such a deformation cannot be considered as a mere
discovery.
So, although we are not so much used to think in this
way, to observe the position of a classical object is in fact
a process that involves a creation aspect, as the entity’s
position is literally created during its observation, and
this is so even though the chosen detection instrument
does not disturb in any way the object in question!
XIV. PRODUCT OBSERVATIONS OF
RELATIONAL PROPERTIES
In the previous section we have considered the possi-
bility to also classify observations by distinguishing those
we have called intrinsic, which are stably associated to
a physical entity, independently of a specific observer,
from those we have called relational, which are of a much
more ephemeral character and can only be attributed to
composite systems formed by the physical entity under
investigation and a specific observer.
We have also emphasized that relational properties are
literally created during the observation, as they require
making a choice about the observational process to be
performed (for instance by placing the measuring appa-
ratus in a certain location or state of motion); a choice
that will affect the result of the observation. We have
done so by considering the simple example of the ob-
servation of the position of a classical body, but other
examples would have been possible, like for instance the
observation of the velocity or the energy of a classical
entity.
We want now, in this section, to push further our anal-
ysis of relational properties, considering them also in sit-
uations where the choice made by the observer is not un-
der her/his control, as in Aert’s quantum machine. This
will help us getting closer to the understanding of the
mystery of quantum measurements.
For this, we consider one of the homogeneous elastic
bands used in Aerts’ quantum machine. Here we are
not thinking of the elastic as an apparatus to be used to
measure the position of a point-like particle, as we did in
Section XII, but as a physical entity per se, about which
we want to observe the physical properties.
An elastic band entity has many interesting proper-
ties, like for instance its length when in its unstreched
condition, its mass, volume, etc. What we shall consider,
however, are some less conventional properties, that we
shall call the left-handedness and the fragmentation of
the elastic (this example is a variant of the “spaghetti
model” presented in Ref. [15]).
To observe the left-handedness of an elastic, the pro-
cedure is the following: “Grab the two ends of the elas-
tic with both hands, then stretch it until it breaks (this
one can always do, as an elastic possesses the intrinsic
property of breakability). If the longest fragment re-
mains in your left hand, then the observation of the left-
handedness has been successful (see Fig. 3).”
FIG. 3: Observing the left-handedness of an elastic band.
Now, the observational procedure, to be complete,
must specify how to observe the left-handedness also
when the elastic is already broken, in two or more frag-
ments (which is always the case once the left-handedness
test has been carried out). The prescription is the fol-
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lowing: “If the elastic is already broken, simply do the
experiment using the longest fragment.”
Similarly to the position observation of the point-
particle in Aerts’ quantum machine model, one cannot
determine in advance if an elastic is left-handed, and
this is not imputable to one’s lack of knowledge about
its state. Even with a full knowledge of all of the elas-
tic intrinsic properties, down to the molecular level, one
cannot predict the outcome of the observation, as the left-
handedness property is created during the observation it-
self, according to the specific point where the elastic-
entity breaks, as a consequence of fluctuating factors that
are not under the control of the observer.
Imagine now that you have just observed with success
the left-handedness of an elastic and want to repeat on
that same elastic the same observation. According to
the procedure, all you have to do is to take the longest
fragment, grab it with your two hands, stretch it until it
breaks and observe if the longest fragment remains again
in your left hand.
Clearly, the fact that the previous observation was
successful doesn’t help at all in predicting the outcome
of the second observation. Indeed, to be re-observed,
the left-handedness property has to be re-created, and
the creation mechanism is non-deterministic. The situ-
ation is clearly different compared to the observation of
the (u, ρ)-position of the point-particle in Aerts’ quan-
tum machine. Indeed, as the reader will remember, once
the particle’s (u, ρ)-position is observed (created), subse-
quent observations of the same (u, ρ)-position will pro-
duce the same outcome, which means that the (u, ρ)-
position has become an intrinsic, stable property, of the
(otherwise static) point-particle entity.
The ephemerality of the left-handedness property of
the elastic band is very similar to the ephemerality of
most properties of microscopic quantum entities, like for
instance the position of an electron. Indeed, quantum
mechanics tells us that, in general, not only one cannot
predict the position of a microscopic entity prior to the
measurement, but neither can one do it a finite time fol-
lowing it, however small such a finite time is. And the
same is true for the observation of other properties, like
momentum, which is incompatible with the position ob-
servation, as expressed by Heisenberg’s uncertainty prin-
ciple.
Let us turn for a moment to the question of incom-
patibility, and ask if also the observation of ephemeral
properties like left-handedness can exhibit incompatibil-
ity, as it is the case for quantum observables. To do so,
let us consider the fragmentation property that we men-
tioned above, which we operationally define as follows:
“Put all the elastic’s fragments into a box, shake the box
well so that all the fragments get mixed. Then, closing
your eyes, open the cover of the box and grab the first
fragment you touch. Opening again your eyes, check if it
is shorter than half the length of the original unbroken
elastic. If it is so, the observation of the fragmentation
property has been successful.”
Clearly, for an unbroken elastic the fragmentation
property cannot be observed. This means that the in-
verse property of non-fragmentation, defined by the same
observational procedure as per above, but by replacing
the term “shorter” with the term “longer,” is an intrin-
sic property of the unbroken elastic entity. But of course,
as soon as the elastic band is broken, as a result for in-
stance of an invasive observation of the left-handedness
property, the fragmentation property has some chance to
be observed. But it cannot be observed with certainty,
as is clear from the fact that the observational procedure
(which is non-invasive for the elastic) involves a hidden
selection mechanism which is not under the control of the
observer. So, fragmentation, as left-handedness, is typi-
cally an ephemeral property, and not an intrinsic prop-
erty.
However, similarly to the (intrinsic) burnability and
floatability properties of the piece of wood entity, the
(non-intrinsic) left-handedness and fragmentation prop-
erties of the elastic band also entertain an incompatibility
relation. Indeed, the observation of the left-handedness
property considerably increases the probability that the
observation of the fragmentation property will be suc-
cessful, as is clear from the fact that the greater number
of fragments, the higher will be the probability that the
observer will pick one which is shorter than one half of
the original length. In other terms, by performing first
the left-handedness observation we influence the outcome
of the successive fragmentation test, which is clearly an
expression of experimental incompatibility.
So, incompatibility is a general phenomenon. It
doesn’t only manifest for the observation of intrinsic
properties, but also for ephemeral ones. The present
example is about an incompatibility relation between
an invasive property involving a creation aspect (left-
handedness) and a non-invasive property only involving
a discovery aspect (fragmentation). However, one can
also easily exhibit examples of incompatibility between
ephemeral properties which are both invasive, and we re-
fer for this to the spaghetti example recently presented
in Ref. [15].
Having highlighted that properties, despite their
ephemeral character, can nevertheless entertain incom-
patibility relations with other ephemeral properties, and
that this fact is not a prerogative of quantum microscopic
entities, we want now to clarify that their ephemeral char-
acter is a consequence of the fact that they are not, strictu
sensu, properties of the elastic, but relational properties
of the composite system made of the elastic plus the mea-
suring apparatus (the hands of the observer in this case).
This is quite obvious if one looks closely at the true
meaning of a property like the left-handedness. Indeed,
to be left-handed, an elastic needs... hands! More pre-
cisely, it needs the hands of the observer, i.e., the presence
of the measuring apparatus and, more precisely, to enter-
tain a very specific relation with it. Indeed, it is only for
as long as the longest fragment remains attached to the
left hand of the observer that we can say that the elas-
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tic possesses in actuality the left-handedness property.
However, to quote the last sentence in Ref. 4 “[...] a
measuring process is in a certain sense a unification and
then again a separation of the measuring apparatus, and
the physical system.”
Undeniably, it is one of our unconscious assumptions
that when we observe something about a given entity,
what we’re observing is something that pertains to that
entity. But in our previous discussion we have seen that
this assumption is not necessarily true, in particular be-
cause many times our observational processes can liter-
ally create what we are observing, and that this doesn’t
happen only in the microscopic quantum domain. How-
ever, we may still believe that once our observation has
created the property which is being observed, such prop-
erty will then stably belong to the entity, i.e., it will be-
come one of its intrinsic properties. But this, again, is
not necessarily the case, as many of the properties we ob-
serve are in fact relational properties, as is evidenced by
our analysis of the position measurement in Section XIII.
Now, if properties are relational, they can remain ac-
tual only for as long as the specific relation that defines
them will not be broken, i.e., for as long as the observer
and the observed remain, in a sense, united in a very par-
ticular way. But, as noted by Aerts in the above quote, a
measure typically involves an initial phase of unification
followed by a final phase of separation. This means that
a relational property will in general first be created and
then destroyed at the end of a measuring process.
This is what we can clearly see in our paradigmatic
example of the observation of the left-handedness prop-
erty. There is a moment during which the hands of the
observer interact with the elastic entity, until a specific
outcome is produced. If the outcome is successful, then
the left-handedness relational property becomes mani-
fest, i.e., actual, as is evidenced by the fact that the
longest fragment dangles from the observer’s left hand
(see Fig.3). But this is only true for as long as such
a configuration will be maintained, because in the very
moment the observer will let go the elastic, the relational
left-handedness property will be lost, and the only way to
observe it again, i.e., to create it again, is to follow once
more the corresponding non-deterministic observational
procedure.
Of course, once the procedure has been completed,
and the left-handedness property observed, traces of the
interaction that took place could be maintained in the
structure of the measuring apparatus, even after the lat-
ter has separated from the entity. This we can easily
do for instance in our example by adding a camera to
the experiment, to register the result of each individual
observation. But these traces, like the spots we see on
recording screens when we “detect” (in fact create) the
positions of microscopic entities, are just what they are,
traces! That is, memories of ephemeral relational prop-
erties that have already ceased to be.
We will now conclude the present section by providing
a general conceptual characterization of quantum mea-
surements. A first important characteristic of these mea-
surements is that they are non-deterministic, in the sense
that their outcome can only be predicted in probabilistic
terms. As shown by Aerts in his hidden measurement ap-
proach [7, 11], the probabilistic aspect of quantum mea-
surements can be described in terms of (hidden) product
observations, involving a symmetry breaking mechanism
that is beyond the control power of the observer. Another
important characteristic is that quantum measurements
involve a pure creation aspect (a fact that is usually de-
scribed in the literature by the more vague concept of
contextuality, expressing the fact that the results of our
experiments depends in general upon how they are per-
formed).
Indeed, when we measure the position of an electron,
we are not in fact discovering the location where the elec-
tron was, prior to our observation, but we are literally
creating a spatial localization for it. This is not only
because, as we observed in Section XIII, even the obser-
vation of the position of a classical body involves an act
of creation, but because, more surprisingly, microscopic
quantum entities are truly non-spatial entities. By this
we mean that, contrary to a classical macroscopic entity,
PA(R3) is not an actual property if A is microscopic,
since the uncertainty principle doesn’t allow us to pre-
dict, not even in principle, its spatial locations, meaning
that these locations cannot pre-exist the observational
process (a precise version of this argument can be found
in Ref. [15]).
Another paradigmatic example, indicating that quan-
tum properties are created by the measurement process,
is provided by the famous Kochen-Specker theorem [28],
proving that it is impossible to attribute specific a priori
values to the square of the spin of a spin-1 entity, along
a given number of axis, in a way that would be com-
patible with the possible experimental outcomes. But if
the entity cannot possess, in general, specific spin val-
ues prior to their observation, this is just another way of
saying that these values are created by the observational
process.
A last important characteristic of quantum measure-
ments is that they correspond to the observation of
ephemeral properties, i.e., of properties that in general
can only be actual for a moment. Following our previ-
ous analysis, ephemerality appears to be a consequence
of the relational character of quantum properties. In
other words, if quantum properties are only ephemer-
ically brought into existence by the very observational
process that define them, this is because they essentially
express the actuality of a relation between the entity and
the measuring apparatus; a relation that ceases to be ac-
tual as soon as the observation has been performed and
the entity and apparatus are again (experimentally) sep-
arated.
Summarizing all this, we can say that a typical quan-
tum measurement can be understood as an observation
about a relational property between the observed quan-
tum entity and the observing apparatus, entailing a sym-
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metry breaking mechanism which is not under the control
of the experimenter; a mechanism which selects, in a non-
predictable way, a single, possibly deterministic, invasive
observational process, of the creation kind.
XV. INTERMEDIARY OBSERVATIONS
We would like to conclude now our review of the dif-
ferent observational processes, by further explaining the
meaning of intermediary observations, which are neither
purely classical, nor purely quantum, but truly interme-
diary – quantum-like – observations. We have already
mentioned them in Section XII, in relation to Aerts’
quantum machine, when referring to its -model variant,
where the elastics are not any more uniformly breakable.
In this model,  is a continuous parameter that can be
varied from 0 to 1. In the  = 0 limit, the elastics can be
broken only in a given point, so that the observational
processes are purely classical, in the sense that the out-
comes can be predicted by only knowing the state of the
entity. On the other hand, in the  = 1 limit, the elastics
are perfectly uniform and the observational processes,
as we explained, are purely quantum, i.e., structurally
equivalent to the spin of a spin-1/2 quantum entity, re-
producing the same transition probabilities of a typical
Stern-Gerlach experiment. But in the intermediary situ-
ation, 0 <  < 1, the elastics used have a more complex
structure, as they are uniformly breakable only in their
middle segment (the length of which is proportional to
), so that the outcome of the observational processes can
either be predictable, or unpredictable, according to the
initial state of the entity (which determines where the
point-particle will stick on the elastic, when falling or-
thogonally onto it). An intermediary situation of this sort
gives rise to a state-space structure that cannot be mod-
elized by a classical phase-space or a quantum Hilbert
space, as was demonstrated in [6]. In other terms, inter-
mediary observations are associated to more general and
complex structures than those originating from purely
classical and quantum observations.
Another interesting example of intermediary observa-
tional processes was recently presented by the present au-
thor in Ref. [27], where a macroscopic quantum machine,
called the δ-quantum-machine, was introduced, which is
able to reproduce the transmission and reflection proba-
bilities of a one-dimensional quantum scattering process
by a Dirac delta-function potential. By varying the ob-
servational procedures, the machine can exhibit a whole
range of intermediary behaviors that cannot be described
by a classical or quantum scattering system.
Here we want to provide a truly elementary example
of an intermediary observation that, depending on the
state of the system, can give rise to either predictable
or unpredictable outcomes for the observational process.
In fact, we have already introduced such an example in
Section XIV, when we have defined the observation of the
fragmentation property of an elastic band. According to
the state of the elastic band, such an observation can be
either totally predictable or perfectly unpredictable.
To see this, we remark that subsequent observations
of the left-handedness (or breakability) property will put
the elastic in different states, characterized by an increas-
ing number of its fragments. In general terms, as we
already observed, this will increase the probability of ob-
serving the fragmentation property. However, as soon as
the elastic is in a state such that the length of all its frag-
ments is lesser than one-half of the total original length,
then the fragmentation property can be observed with
certainty. In other terms, depending on the state of the
entity, the outcome can either be predictable or unpre-
dictable, i.e., both situations can occur, for a same sys-
tem. This is quite different from typical classical obser-
vations, where independently of the state of the system
the outcome is always predictable, or typical quantum
observations, where the outcome is never predictable (if
not in probabilistic terms).
To the last statement one can of course object that
there are circumstances, also for quantum entities, when
certain observations can be predicted in advance, as is
the case for example for the electric charge of an electron.
This is correct, and is the reason why in general we should
not speak of quantum or classical systems (or entities),
but of quantum, classical and intermediary observational
processes (or properties), as a given system can exhibit
both quantum and classical properties.
The crucial point about intermediary observations,
which distinguish them from classical and quantum ones,
is the fact that, for a same observational process (i.e.,
a same property) the outcome can be either perfectly
predictable, or perfectly unpredictable (but nevertheless
possibly predictable in probabilistic terms), according to
the state in which the observed system is prepared, and
this is a situation that cannot be duly modelized in the
ambit of the mathematical structure of a phase space or
Hilbert space [6].
XVI. NON-SPATIALITY
It is now time to draw some conclusions from our
overview of the observational processes in physical sys-
tems. We have analyzed observation taking into consid-
eration different perspectives. We have started by con-
sidering that observations can be perfectly non-invasive,
when they are performed without a specific scope, but
can easily become partially, or totally invasive, when
they address very specific questions to the entities under
consideration. This invasiveness of the observational pro-
cesses can either manifest in terms of destruction of the
observed properties, or creation of them, with modali-
ties that can vary according to the operational definition
chosen to define the property which is being observed.
We have seen that all this is independent of the fact that
the observed systems are macroscopic or microscopic, so
that much of the strangeness of quantum observations,
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in particular their contextuality, is in fact also present
in conventional entities (and therefore is not so strange
after all).
Another interesting aspect we have emphasized is that
incompatibility is also a general feature of macroscopic
entities, related to the fact that observing an entity will in
general affect its state, and therefore also affect the out-
come of subsequent observations. This however doesn’t
mean that we cannot conjunctly observe incompatible ob-
servables. To do so, we only have to use a very special ob-
servational procedure, called product observation. Such
a procedure involves a non-deterministic act of choice,
through which a specific, deterministic observational pro-
cess is selected among a number of potential ones, and
then implemented.
If such a selection is the result of a symmetry break-
ing mechanism, which remains hidden from the “view”
of the observer, and is therefore beyond her/his control
power, a quantum probabilistic structure may emerge, as
it has been shown by Aerts, in his hidden measurement
approach [7, 11].
We have also seen that a typical feature of quantum
observations (measurements) is the ephemerality of the
observed properties, and we have proposed an explana-
tion of this fact in terms of relational properties: quan-
tum observations are about relational properties between
the system and the measuring apparatus, and since, at
the end of a measurement process, their connection is
generally severed, this is the reason why the observed
properties, once they have been created by the interac-
tion, they are also immediately after destroyed (as soon
as that same interaction between the entity and the mea-
suring apparatus is “switched off.”) This would explain
the typical ephemerality (i.e., the non-intrinsicness, or
lack of objectification) of quantum properties.
In our analysis we have also emphasized that relational
properties are ubiquitous also in classical physics, as also
the observation of position, momentum, energy, etc, of
a classical body are in fact the expression of irreducible
relational properties between the observed entity and the
reference frame associated to the measuring apparatus.
Moreover, we have seen that product observations are
also “hidden” in classical physics, although they are not,
as a rule, recognized as such, seeing that the process
through which an observer chooses a specific observa-
tional process, by choosing for instance a specific refer-
ence frame, is not considered as an integral part of the
experiment.
But if we enlarge our perspective, and duly understand
the observation of, for example, the position of (the cen-
ter of mass of) a macroscopic body A, as the observa-
tion of a relational property between A and a measuring
apparatus R, then choosing a specific state for R (here
understood in its function of reference frame) is about
performing a specific (invasive) act of creation on the
composite system {A,R}. And in that sense, we must
acknowledge that classical measurements and quantum
measurements are in fact much more similar than what
we would have expected.
Using different reference frames to observe the prop-
erties of a given body A is therefore not a process as
passive as is usually understood. Indeed, since most of
the observed properties are irreducibly relational, when
we consider the point of view of different observers, asso-
ciated to different frames of reference, we have to admit
that they are not, strictly speaking, observing the same
property. In fact, when we speak about the position of A,
what we truly mean is the “position-relational property
between A and R” – let us denote it qA,R – which is a
property not of A, but of the composite entity {A,R}.
So, when we change the observer, shifting from reference
frame R to, say, reference frame R′, the R′-observer is
now observing a different relational property – qA,R′ –
associated to a different composite entity {A,R′}.
Of course, the R′-observer may also be interested in
observing the relational properties associated to the com-
posite system {R,R′}, and ask if the knowledge of them
would allow her/him to deduce the properties of {A,R}
from those of {A,R′}, and vice versa. This possibility is
made manifest by the existence of certain mathematical
transformations, the nature of which depends of course
on the type of relational properties existing between R
and R′. When R and R′ are for instance two inertial
frames, and if we are only interested in time and position
relational properties, then these transformations are the
well-known Galilean or Lorentz transformations.
An interesting aspect is that there are certain classes of
actions that one can perform on both subsystems A and
R, such that they will leave the properties of the com-
posite system {A,R} totally unaffected. As it was lucidly
pointed out by Poincare´ beginning of last century [30], it
is the possibility of these correlative actions (called dis-
placements), that leave the properties of the composite
system {A,R} unchanged, that has brought us human
beings, in the course of our evolution, to construct the
geometrical Euclidean space, as a convenient way to rep-
resent the ensemble of all possible displacement-actions.
This of course doesn’t mean that our Euclidean space
would just be a pure human invention. On that pur-
pose, it is appropriate to quote Aerts, commenting on
Poincare´’s findings [5]:
“[Poincare´] analyses how the reality of three dimen-
sional Euclidean (or non-Euclidean) space, has been con-
structed from our daily experiences as a human being
with the objects that are most important for us (rigid
bodies), and closely around. This does not mean that
this three dimensional space is an ‘invention’ of human-
ity. It exists, but the way we have ordered, and later on
formalized it, by means of specific mathematical mod-
els, does make part of it. In other words, what we call
the three dimensional reality of space partly exists in its
own and partly exists by the structures that we have con-
structed, relying on our specific human experience with
it.”
In fact, as Poincare´ pointed out, also deformations
of (non-rigid) macroscopic bodies can be understood in
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terms of displacements, if we conceive a macroscopic
body as an aggregate formed by a number of separated
sub-entities, so that it is the displacement of some of
them, with respect to some others, that would produce
the perceived overall deformation effect of the macro-
scopic body. And this is why also deformations can be
visualized, to some extent, in our ordinary space.
But the construction of our Euclidean spatial the-
atre, although suitable for representing actions of dis-
placement, certainly cannot represent all possible actions
that can be performed on entities. Consider for exam-
ple a ten dollar bill and the action of tearing it in two
pieces [42]. Where are the ten dollars once the bill has
been torn? Strictly speaking, they disappear from our
Euclidean physical space, and in replacement of them,
two new “piece of paper” entities appear. Clearly, this
breaking-action, which is a creation-destruction process,
cannot be described by a simple displacement, and this
is the reason why after it we cannot any longer represent
the ten dollars in our space.
But we also agree that the ten dollars didn’t completely
disappear from our reality: they still exist, but in a differ-
ent sense than before. If before the breaking-action they
were ten actual dollars, belonging to our physical space,
following the breaking-action they have become ten po-
tential dollars, not any more belonging to our physical
space, but nevertheless still belonging to our reality, as is
clear from the fact they can be reassembled, for instance
by taping the two pieces together. In other terms, there
are different possible modes of existence for entities, and
when they shift from one mode to the other, this can
cause them to leave our ordinary physical space, i.e., not
be any more represented inside of it (such a mechanism
was recently analyzed in Ref. 27, by means of the concept
of process-actuality, and we refer the interested reader to
this paper for further discussion of this topic).
Now, as we remarked before, when displacement-
actions are simultaneously performed upon two subsys-
tems A and R, the relational properties among them re-
main unchanged, and the observation of such correlations
is a key ingredient in the construction of our Euclidean
space. (To really understand why it is so, we refer the
interested reader to Poincare´ “Science and Hypothesis”
booklet [30], and more particularly to its chapter 4, where
the author thoroughly explains how an attentive analy-
sis of the laws governing our sensorial impressions could
have brought us to the concept of a geometrical space.
In this analysis, a key ingredient is the observation of the
existence of certain “correlative movements,” that allows
to connect certain classes of phenomena, which otherwise
we should never have thought of connecting).
On the other hand, as the reader will surely agree, if a
breaking-action is simultaneously performed upon A and
R, all relational properties among them will be radically
affected. In other terms, and contrary to a displacement-
action, a breaking-action performed on both subsystems
A and R will not leave the properties of the composite
system {A,R} unchanged (in fact, and depending on how
the subcomponents A and R have been defined, it can go
as far as to completely destroy it). And this is why (fol-
lowing here the same line of reasoning as Poincare´) these
breaking-actions haven’t given rise to the construction of
a geometric space that would have played a similar role
as the one played by the Euclidean space in relation to
displacements.
Now, assuming, as we did, that the specificity of quan-
tum observations (i.e., measurements) is that they corre-
spond to observations of relational properties performed
through acts of creation that involve processes of the
breaking-kind (think about the breaking of the elastic
band when observing “its” left-handedness, and more
generally about “the actual breaking the symmetry of the
potential” in a “hidden” product observation), we can
easily understand why quantum entities, like electrons,
cannot be conveniently represented within our Euclidean
space, as they belong in fact to a larger space of poten-
tialities, that we humans have just begun to discover and
construct.
The non-ordinary spatiality of quantum entities, which
is in fact an expression of their non-locality (non-locality
is non-spatiality!) has been thoroughly analyzed by
Aerts, in a number of papers [5–7], and more recently
also by the present author [15, 27, 31]. For a further
analysis of this important concept, we therefore invite
the interested reader to consult these works.
It is worth mentioning that the insufficiency of the
Euclidean representation also becomes manifest when
dealing with relativistic entities, moving at high rela-
tive speeds, as space and time (relational) properties
get mixed in this case, as shown by Lorentz transfor-
mations. To duly represent classical (in the sense of non-
quantum) observations, one has then to replace the three-
dimensional space by a genuine four-dimensional struc-
ture. This however doesn’t simply consist in replacing
our naive three-dimensional spatial theatre by an equally
naive four-dimensional spacetime theatre, in which real
change wouldn’t be possible, as was evidenced by Aerts
in his subtle analysis of the geometric and process-like
aspects which are inherent in our construction of real-
ity; an analysis to which we also refer the interested
reader [7, 32, 33].
Here we just remark that in our ordinary (non-
relativistic) experience with classical macroscopic enti-
ties, the length of a rod, or the ticking rate of a clock,
are usually considered as typical intrinsic properties, that
could be equivalently observed by different inertial ob-
servers, independently of their relative state of motion.
On the other hand, relativity taught us that this is not
generally true: rods’ lengths contract and clocks run
slower when their velocity relative to an observer is in-
creased.
These relativistic effects can of course be understood
according to Einsteinian (geometric) interpretation of rel-
ativity as generalized parallax effects: the fact that two
different inertial observers, R and R′, do observe (i.e.,
measure) different lengths (ticking rates) for a same rod
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(clock) A, simply means that what we thought were in-
trinsic properties, are in fact observer-dependent rela-
tional properties. This being understood, there is no
more mystery in the fact that a specific property of com-
posite system {A,R}, that we improperly call the length
(clock rate) of A, will generally differ from that same
property associated to composite system {A,R′}. Seeing
that {A,R} and {A,R′} are different systems, there are
no a priori reasons to expect they should exhibit identical
properties.
On the other hand, these same relativistic effects can
also be understood according to a Lorentz (process-like)
interpretation of relativity. Indeed, if we understand the
composite system {A,R′} as the system that is obtained
following a certain action of dynamical “deformation” on
system {A,R} – precisely that action which transforms
its subcomponent R into R′ – then we can also advo-
cate that typical relativistic effects are the result of real
physical actions performed on the observed entity, and
this without the need to invoke the existence of an ether.
The point is that, contrary to what is usually assumed,
we are not truly observing properties of entity A, but
properties of a larger composite entity {A,R}.
It could be objected that relativistic effects, like time
dilation, take primarily place not during the period of
acceleration that transforms a reference system R, say
initially at rest with respect to A, into a reference sys-
tem R′, moving at a certain constant velocity with re-
spect to it. Therefore, it wouldn’t be correct to say
that it is the process R → R′ that is responsible for
the observed relativistic effects. Well, this depends how
we interpret such a statement. Relativistic effects, as
we emphasized, are an expression of relational properties
which, we do agree, only depend on the relative velocity
between A and R′, and not on a previous acceleration
process that has brought R′ to acquire its relative state
of motion. However, it is precisely such a prior accel-
eration that created these velocity-dependent (and not
acceleration-dependent) relational properties. In other
terms, we must not confuse here the process that created
a given property, with the property itself.
We conclude this work emphasizing that, whether in
classical/relativistic or quantum physics, many of our in-
terpretational problems might be the result of an insuf-
ficient understanding of the articulated structure of an
observational process, and in particular of the fact that
many of our observations are in fact, so to say, meta-
observations, i.e., observations of (intrinsic or relational)
properties that are created (or destroyed) by the obser-
vational process itself.
[1] C. Piron, “Foundations of Quantum Physics,” W. A.
Benjamin Inc., Massachusetts (1976).
[2] C. Piron, “La Description d’un Syste`me Physique et le
Pre´suppose´ de la The´orie Classique,” Annales de la Fon-
dation Louis de Broglie, 3, pp. 131-152 (1978).
[3] C. Piron, “Me´canique quantique. Bases et applications,”
Presses polytechniques et universitaires romandes, Lau-
sanne (Second corrected edition 1998), First Edition
(1990).
[4] D. Aerts, “Description of many physical entities with-
out the paradoxes encountered in quantum mechanics,”
Found. Phys., 12, pp. 1131–1170 (1982).
[5] D. Aerts, “An attempt to imagine parts of the reality
of the micro-world,” pp. 3–25, in “Problems in Quan-
tum Physics II; Gdansk ’89,” eds. Mizerski, J., et al.,
World Scientific Publishing Company, Singapore (1990).
An Italian translation of this article is also available:
“Un tentativo di immaginare parti del micromondo,” Au-
toRicerca, Volume 2, pp. 77–109 (2011).
[6] D. Aerts, “The entity and modern physics: the creation-
discovery view of reality,” in “Interpreting Bodies: Clas-
sical and Quantum Objects in Modern Physics, ” ed.
Castellani, E. Princeton Unversity Press, Princeton
(1998).
[7] D. Aerts, “The Stuff the World is Made of: Physics
and Reality,” pp. 129–183, in “The White Book of ‘Ein-
stein Meets Magritte’,” Edited by Diederik Aerts, Jan
Broekaert and Ernest Mathijs, Kluwer Academic Pub-
lishers, Dordrecht, 274 pp. (1999).
[8] D. Aerts, “The missing element of reality in the descrip-
tion of quantum mechanics of the EPR paradox situa-
tion,” Helv. Phys. Acta, 57, pp. 421–428 (1984).
[9] D. Aerts, “The construction of reality and its influence on
the understanding of quantum structures,” Int. J. Theor.
Phys., 31, pp. 1815-1837 (1992).
[10] W. Christiaens, “Some notes on Aerts’ interpretation of
the EPR-paradox and the violation of Bell-inequalities,”
pp. 259–286, in “Probing the Structure of Quantum Me-
chanics: Nonlinearity, Nonlocality, Computation and Ax-
iomatics,” World Scientific, Singapore, 394 pp. (2002).
[11] D. Aerts, “A possible Explanation for the Probabilities of
Quantum Mechanics,” J. Math, Phys., 27, pp. 202–210
(1992).
[12] “Sheldrake and his critics: the sense of being glared at,”
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 12, pp. 1–126 (2005).
[13] W. Heisenberg, “The Physical Principles of Quantum
Theory,” University of Chicago Press (1930).
[14] A. Einstein, B. Podolsky and N. Rosen, “Can Quantum-
Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be Consid-
ered Complete?,” Phys. Rev., 47, pp. 777-780 (1935).
[15] Sassoli de Bianchi, M., “Ephemeral Properties and the Il-
lusion of Microscopic Particles,” Foundations of Science,
16, No. 4 pp. 393–409 (2011); doi: 10.1007/s10699-011-
9227-x. An Italian translation of the article is also avail-
able: “Proprieta´ effimere e l’illusione delle particelle mi-
croscopiche,” AutoRicerca, Volume 2, pp. 39–76 (2011).
[16] D. Aerts, “Reality and probability: introducing a new
type of probability calculus,” pp. 205–229, in “Probing
the Structure of Quantum Mechanics: Nonlinearity, Non-
locality, Computation and Axiomatics,” World Scientific,
Singapore, 394 pp. (2002).
[17] D. Aerts, “Being and change: foundations of a realis-
tic operational formalism,” pp. 71–110, in “Probing the
Structure of Quantum Mechanics: Nonlinearity, Nonlo-
20
cality, Computation and Axiomatics,” World Scientific,
Singapore, 394 pp. (2002).
[18] D. Aerts, “Quantum mechanics: structures, axioms and
paradoxes,” pp. 141–205, in “The Indigo Book of ‘Ein-
stein Meets Magritte’,” Edited by Diederik Aerts, Jan
Broekaert and Ernest Mathijs, Kluwer Academic Pub-
lishers, Dordrecht, 239 pp. (1999).
[19] S. Smets, “The modes of physical properties in the logical
foundations of physics,” Logic and Logical Philosophy,
14, pp. 37–53 (2005).
[20] J. H. Conway and S. Kochen, “The free will theorem,”
Found. of Physics, 36, pp. 1441–1473 (2006).
[21] J. H. Conway and S. Kochen, “The strong free will the-
orem,” Notices of the American Mathematical Society,
56, pp. 226–232 (2009).
[22] D. Aerts, B. Coecke, B. D’Hooghe and F. Valckenborgh,
A mechanistic macroscopic physical entity with a three-
dimensional Hilbert space description, Helv. Phys. Acta,
70, 793–802 (1997).
[23] D. Aerts, “Quantum Structures, Separated Physical En-
tities and Probability, ” Found. of Physics, 24, p. 1227
(1994).
[24] B. Coecke, “Hidden measurement representation for
quantum entities described by finite dimensional complex
Hilbert spaces,” Found. Phys., 25, p. 203 (1995).
[25] B. Coecke, “Generalization of the proof on the existence
of hidden measurements to experiments with an infinite
set of outcomes,” Found. Phys. Lett., 8, p. 437 (1995).
[26] B. Coecke, “New examples of hidden measurement sys-
tems and outline of a general scheme,” Tatra Mountains
Mathematical Publications, 10, p. 203 (1996).
[27] Sassoli de Bianchi, M., “The δ-quantum machine,
the k-model, and the non-ordinary spatiality of quan-
tum entities,” To appear in: Foundations of Science,
arXiv:1104.4738v2 [quant-ph] (2011).
[28] S. Kochen and E.P. Specker, “The problem of hidden
variables in quantum mechanics,” Journal of Mathemat-
ics and Mechanics, 17, pp. 59–87 (1967).
[29] A.M. Gleason, Measures on the Closed Subspaces of a
Hilbert Space, J. Math. Mech., 6, 885–893 (1957).
[30] H. Poincare´, “La science et l’hypothe`se,” Flammarion,
Paris (1902).
[31] M. Sassoli de Bianchi, “From permanence to total avail-
ability: a quantum conceptual upgrade,” To appear in:
Foundations of Science, doi: 10.1007/s10699-011-9233-z.
[32] Aerts, D., “Relativity theory: what is reality?” Found.
Phys. 26, pp. 1627–1644 (1996).
[33] Aerts, D., “Towards a framework for possible unification
of quantum and relativity theories,” Int. J. Theor. Phys.
35, pp. 2399–2416 (1996).
[34] To be truthful, we must say that such a prejudice strongly
holds only for unanimated entities. Indeed, the observa-
tion of living entities, like when a hunter hides to observe
a prey from afar, can possibly involve some very subtle
levels of inevitable disturbance that could influence the
behavior of the living entity being observed. The real-
ity of such phenomena, like the so-called sense of being
stared at, is very controversial in scientific circles, despite
some available evidences in their favor (see for instance
Ref. 12, a special issue of the Journal of Consciousness
Studies dedicated to this controversial subject). But in-
dependently of the truth of these phenomena, we must
observe, for intellectual honesty, that the common be-
lief within humans is that living entities are capable to
sense, in some mysterious way, if other living entities are
focusing their attention upon them.
[35] The paradigmatic example of a piece of wood, that we
shall further analyze later in the article, was firstly in-
troduced by Aerts, in his PhD thesis [4], as a means to
illustrate the important concept of experimental incom-
patibility.
[36] This freedom in considering different possible definitions
for the properties that we associate to physical entities
reveals that there is an important level of conventional-
ity in our description of the world. This doesn’t mean
that physical properties are totally arbitrary or subjec-
tive, but that there is also an important human part in
their construction.
[37] Such a protocol, consisting in asking a question by spec-
ifying the experiment to be performed and the rule to be
used to interpret the results of the experiment in terms
of “yes” (successful) and “no” (unsuccessful) alternatives,
is usually called a yes/no-question, yes/no-experiment, or
experimental project in the ambit of the Geneva-Brussels
school.
[38] If the particle’s horizontal position prior to the observa-
tion is exactly in correspondence with the tip of one of
the teeth, then of course we cannot anymore predict with
certainty the outcome of the observation, as it will be the
result of a symmetry breaking mechanism.
[39] Regarding the question of attributing several properties
at once, see in particular the interesting discussion in the
introductory sections of Ref. 16.
[40] This doesn’t mean however that all meaningful properties
of a physical system should necessarily be testable. See
for instance the discussion in Ref. 19.
[41] Some readers may be tempted to believe that, because
of the well-known Gleason’s theorem [29] and Kochen-
Specker’s impossibility proof [28], it would be unfeasible
to construct hidden-measurement models like the quan-
tum machine one, for Hilbert spaces of dimension greater
than 2. This is however not the case, as No-Go theorems
for hidden variables only apply to models with hidden
variables referring to the state of the system, and not to
models where the hidden variables refer instead to the
observational process; see in particular [22], where an ex-
plicit model is constructed for a 3-dimensional Hilbert
space.
[42] We remember this was one of the favorite examples of
Constantin Piron, when teaching in Geneva his course of
quantum mechanics, whom we had the pleasure of being
the assistant about twenty years ago. Another one was
his emphasis in distinguishing – especially when he was
writing at the blackboard – breakable chalks from broken
ones!
